



Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Uluğ, Özden Melis, Lickel, Brian, Leidner, Bernhard and Hirschberger, Gilad (2021) How do 
conflict narratives shape conflict- and peace-related outcomes among majority group members? 
The role of competitive victimhood in intractable conflicts. Group Processes and Intergroup 
Relations, 24 (5). pp. 797-814. ISSN 1368-4302 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/101801/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
NARRATIVES, VICTIMHOOD, CONFLICT AND PEACE 
1 
 
How do conflict narratives shape conflict- and peace-related outcomes among majority 1 
group members? The role of competitive victimhood in intractable conflicts 2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
Previous research in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict context highlighted two opposing conflict 5 
narratives: (a) a terrorism narrative and (b) an independence narrative. In this paper, we 6 
argue that these narratives are relevant to protracted and asymmetrical intergroup conflict 7 
(e.g., independence struggles), and therefore have consequences for conflict- and peace-8 
related outcomes regardless of conflict contexts. We tested this generalizability hypothesis in 9 
parallel studies in the context of Turkish-Kurdish (Study 1) and Israeli-Palestinian relations 10 
(Study 2) among majority group members (Turks and Jewish Israelis, respectively). We also 11 
investigated competitive victimhood as a potential mediating variable in the relationship 12 
between conflict narratives on the one side and support for non-violent conflict resolution, 13 
forgiveness, and support for aggressive policies on the other, in parallel studies with the two 14 
aforementioned contexts. We argued that the terrorism narrative is essentially a negation of 15 
the narrative of the other group, and the independence narrative is a consideration of that 16 
narrative; therefore, competitive victimhood would be lower/higher when the narrative of the 17 
other is acknowledged/denied. Results point to the crucial relationship between endorsing 18 
conflict narratives and conflict- and peace-related outcomes through competitive victimhood, 19 
and to the possibility that these conflict narratives may show some similarities across different 20 
conflict contexts. 21 
 22 
Keywords: conflict narratives, competitive victimhood, Turkish-Kurdish conflict, Israeli-23 
Palestinian conflict, nonviolence.   24 
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How do conflict narratives shape conflict- and peace-related outcomes among majority 1 
group members? The role of competitive victimhood in intractable conflicts1 2 
Intractable conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian and the Turkish-Kurdish conflict 3 
have grim outcomes, including both parties’ alienating each other, forced migration, as well 4 
as the violence and trauma associated with ethnopolitical warfare (Fisher, 2006). Compared to 5 
other conflicts, intractable conflicts are characterized as being particularly resistant to 6 
resolution: irreconcilable, violent, and viewed in a zero-sum nature by their parties (Bar-Tal, 7 
1998). Such conflicts, therefore, make life extremely challenging and stressful (e.g., Qouta, 8 
Punamäki, & ElSarraj, 1995). People and groups respond to these challenges and stressors in 9 
part by developing narratives to understand the conflict.  10 
Attempting to explain how people understand conflict in general, and intractable 11 
conflict in particular, Bar-Tal (1998, 2007) introduced the idea of the ethos of conflict. He 12 
argued that people in societies embroiled in intractable conflict cope with the conflict by 13 
developing socially shared beliefs about it. The ethos of conflict, therefore, constitutes a 14 
socially shared belief system, comprised of eight interrelated themes and beliefs, such as 15 
justness of one’s group’s goals, concern about security for one’s group, the special 16 
victimization of one’s group, among others. Importantly, this socially shared belief system 17 
usually leads to the emergence of a dominant (or master) narrative of the conflict, endorsed by 18 
the majority of society (Bar-Tal, 1998; Hammack, 2006). Previous research found that 19 
endorsement of the ethos of conflict has consequences for conflict and peace, for example, 20 
reducing support for compromise and peaceful conflict resolution (Canetti, Elad-Strenger, 21 
Lavi, Guy, & Bar-Tal, 2017). The idea of an ethos of conflict has thus been an important 22 
starting point in understanding how people frame intractable conflict, and how this 23 
understanding shapes the course of the conflict. 24 
 
1 The authors have no conflict of interest to declare. The authors confirm that the manuscript adheres to ethical 
guidelines specified in the APA Code of Conduct as well as authors’ national ethics guidelines. Materials and 
data related to the research reported in this manuscript may be obtained by contacting the authors.  
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Recent research has gone one step further, examining the diversity of conflict 1 
narratives (Cohrs, Uluğ, Stahel, & Kışlıoğlu, 2015). Given that societies in conflict are often 2 
engaged in a lively debate over the nature and cause of the conflict, and ways to manage 3 
and/or resolve it (anonymized for review), a focus on the dominant narrative alone risks 4 
overlooking these dynamics, as it does not capture all narratives in society. In this sense, the 5 
dominant narrative does not give a full account of the reality of societies in conflict. An 6 
understanding of the dominant narrative alongside other, alternative narratives of conflict may 7 
be better suited to capture the complexity of a particular conflict and its consequences, and 8 
therefore, promises to provide a more comprehensive perspective on conflict narratives and 9 
their effects on conflict. In particular, complementing the research conducted by Bar-Tal and 10 
others in this way can deepen the discussion about the consequences of conflict narratives on 11 
conflict resolution, prevention, and peace (see also Cohrs et al., 2015).  12 
Based on these insights, we argue here that in most conflict societies, next to the 13 
dominant narrative based in the ethos of conflict there are alternative conflict narratives. Due 14 
to not being endorsed by a majority of society, these alternative narratives are less prevalent 15 
than the dominant narrative. In this sense, while majority group members may be aware of 16 
alternative narratives, these narratives get less attention and thus are less visible in society 17 
than the dominant narrative (anonymized for review). Yet, due to their potential to increase 18 
openness to compromise and perhaps even pave the way for conflict resolution, alternative 19 
narratives may be as impactful for the course of the conflict as dominant narratives, and 20 
therefore equally important. We believe majority group members tend to less endorse these 21 
alternative narratives as they are more likely to worry that these narratives will pose a threat 22 
to national continuity (van Leeuwen & Mashuri, 2013) due to being endorsed more by 23 
minority group members or “radical” majority members. 24 
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Dominant conflict narratives present the conflict in black and white terms. They 1 
produce mistrust, hostility, a sense of threat between the conflict parties and reduce support 2 
for compromise (Canetti et al., 2017). As dominant narratives influence individuals to 3 
interpret situations in ways that contribute to the perpetuation or even escalation of the 4 
conflict (Cohrs et al., 2015), we argue that alternative narratives may help majority group 5 
members see the conflict in a new light. The identification of such alternative voices may 6 
contribute to a more differentiated conflict analysis and these alternative voices may, in turn, 7 
contribute to more effective approaches to conflict resolution and reconciliation (Coleman, 8 
2003; Shmueli, 2003). These alternative narratives can help to diversify the social realities 9 
that circulate and are considered in society. They may help to develop strategies of change 10 
(Grabe & Dutt, 2015) and can have greater potential for social change in conflict contexts 11 
(Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; see also Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008).  12 
As mentioned earlier, majority group members are not inclined to endorse minority 13 
groups’ conflict narratives (e.g., independence struggles). We tested this hypothesis in the 14 
context of the Turkish-Kurdish and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among majority group 15 
members by investigating whether minority groups’ conflict narratives would predict more 16 
support for non-violent conflict resolution and less support for aggressive policies, whereas 17 
dominant conflict narratives based on the ethos of conflict would predict more support for 18 
violent conflict resolution and aggressive policies (e.g., Canetti et al., 2017). 19 
Dominant and alternative narratives in conflict contexts. Related to our core 20 
hypothesis, previous research in the context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict highlighted two 21 
opposing conflict narratives among lay people: (a) a terrorism narrative that describes the 22 
problem as stemming mainly from the armed wing of the Kurdish national movement, PKK 23 
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), and (b) an independence narrative that describes the problem as 24 
a need for independence for Kurds (anonymized for review). These two conflict narratives 25 
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were created representing the core of these two viewpoints based on the findings of a Q 1 
methodology study (a mixed qualitative-quantitative method; Watts & Stenner, 2012). In this 2 
research, it has been shown that both the terrorism narrative and the independence narrative 3 
may predict the advantaged group’s attitudes (i.e., Turks’ attitudes) towards reconciliation and 4 
the peace process in Turkey (anonymized for review). This research was conducted during the 5 
peace process between 2013 and 2015. However, the peace process ended abruptly in 2015 6 
and the attacks from both sides have been continuing.  7 
By building on previous research on conflict narratives (anonymized for review) and 8 
competitive victimhood (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Sullivan, Landau, 9 
Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012) and taking the political developments in Turkey into 10 
account (e.g., escalation of the conflict within the country and the Syrian conflict in the 11 
region), we decided to focus on conflict-related outcomes such as support for stopping 12 
violence and support for aggressive policies as well as peace-related outcomes such as support 13 
for non-violent conflict resolution and forgiveness. We hypothesized that the terrorism 14 
narrative (as the dominant narrative of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict endorsed most strongly 15 
by the majority of ethnic Turks; anonymized for review) would predict more conflict-related 16 
outcomes (e.g., support for aggressive policies), whereas the independence narrative (as an 17 
important alternative narrative endorsed by a minority of ethnic Turks; anonymized for 18 
review) would predict more peace-related outcomes (e.g., support for non-violent conflict 19 
resolution; forgiveness).This attempt at a psychological understanding of the terrorism 20 
narrative, in particular, can help explain why even powerful conflict parties such as Jewish 21 
Israelis or Turks can consider themselves to be the main victim in the conflict and therefore at 22 
times act more aggressively than seems necessary or justifiable from a third-party’s 23 
perspective. 24 
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Competitive victimhood. Besides our prediction that different conflict narratives will 1 
have different conflict- and peace-related outcomes, we also hypothesized that these conflict 2 
narratives would predict important process variables such as competitive victimhood (i.e., 3 
people’s belief that their group has suffered more than the adversarial group; Noor et al., 4 
2012; Sullivan et al., 2012). In other words, we predicted that competitive victimhood will 5 
mediate the relationship between conflict narrative and conflict- and peace-related outcomes. 6 
In different intergroup contexts, it has been observed that members of advantaged groups are 7 
also motivated to see themselves as victims or relatively deprived such as having suffered 8 
personal or identity-based hardship (e.g., Phillips & Lowery, 2015; Sullivan et al., 2012; see 9 
also Killian, 1985). As groups tend to have a general motivation to maintain a positive in-10 
group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), advantaged group members also tend to see their in-11 
group as the victim and their outgroup as the perpetrator. However, advantaged groups can 12 
experience suffering and engage in competitive victimhood, especially when they are faced 13 
with the threat of radical institutional reforms that lead to significant material redistributions 14 
(Noor et al., 2012). For example, it has been shown that even though the political Left was the 15 
target of most of the physical violence inflicted by the military regime during the Pinochet 16 
rule in Chile, the political Right still often highlights its physical suffering caused by leftist 17 
guerrilla attacks and assassinations (Roniger & Sznajder, 1999). It is argued that the claim of 18 
victimhood by the political Right is a result of radical reforms by Allende’s leftist government 19 
in Chile (Perez de Arce, 2008). 20 
Competitive victimhood affects people’s attitudes toward forgiveness, reconciliation, 21 
and conflict in both conflict and post-conflict settings (e.g., Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, 22 
& Lewis, 2008). For example, it may lead to reduced empathy and less willingness to 23 
reconcile with the adversary (Vollhardt, Bilewicz, & Olechowski, 2015), and to more 24 
negative attitudes toward the other conflict party and toward resolving the conflict in various 25 
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contexts (Noor, Vollhardt, Mari, & Nadler, 2017). It also predicts less willingness to 1 
acknowledge ingroup harm-doing during war (Čehajić & Brown, 2010), less forgiveness 2 
(Noor et al., 2008), and more support for aggressive policies (Adelman et al., 2016).   3 
As we mentioned earlier, conflict narratives may shape people’s attitudes toward 4 
conflict and peace, and people’s beliefs regarding the ingroup’s victimization play a central 5 
role in stirring and sustaining intractable conflict (Bilali & Vollhardt, 2019; Rouhana & Bar-6 
Tal, 1998; Vollhardt, 2012). Importantly, however, the two narratives should predict 7 
competitive victimhood differently. Viewing the outgroup’s actions as acts of terrorism and 8 
making an essentialist attribution such as “they are evil” should leave little room to see the 9 
suffering and victimization of the outgroup, and emphasize the suffering and victimization of 10 
the ingroup. On the other hand, viewing the outgroup’s actions in the conflict as a 11 
consequence of legitimate grievances such as a lack of independence should lead to the 12 
realization that both the ingroup and the outgroup suffered as victims of the conflict. Thus, the 13 
terrorism narrative should strengthen people’s belief that the ingroup has suffered more than 14 
the outgroup, whereas the independence narrative should, if anything, weaken that belief. 15 
These differential effects of the type of narrative on competitive victimhood should then lead 16 
to differential effects in terms of conflict- and peace-related outcomes.  17 
The current studies sought to test several important questions regarding the role of 18 
conflict narratives in intractable conflicts. First, in order to test the generalizability of the role 19 
of conflict narratives, we conducted parallel studies in the context of Turkish-Kurdish 20 
relations (Study 1) and Israeli-Palestinian relations (Study 2), as both conflicts are seen as 21 
intractable and asymmetric. Testing the role of conflict narratives as well as competitive 22 
victimhood in asymmetric conflicts is particularly important because it helps us understand 23 
how groups who differ markedly in power (do not) support different conflict- and peace-24 
related outcomes. In each case, we examined the perspective of majority/dominant group 25 
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members (i.e., Turks and Jewish Israelis, respectively) towards the outgroup (i.e., Kurds and 1 
Palestinians, respectively). Second, we examined the extent to which endorsing independence 2 
and terrorism narratives independently predict conflict- and peace-related outcomes such as 3 
willingness to forgive the outgroup, support for non-violent conflict resolution, aggressive 4 
policies and stopping violence. Third, we also investigated a potential process variable that 5 
transmits the effects of conflict narratives on outcome variables: competitive victimhood. We 6 
hypothesized that stronger endorsement of the independence narrative would predict less 7 
competitive victimhood, whereas stronger endorsement of the terrorism narrative would 8 
predict more competitive victimhood. We also hypothesized that greater competitive 9 
victimhood would predict less support for non-violent conflict resolution, less forgiveness, 10 
less support for stopping violence, and more support for aggressive policies (see Figure 1 for 11 
the theoretical model).  12 
____________ 13 
Insert Figure 1  14 
   ____________ 15 
Study 1 16 
In Study 1, we examined the perspectives of the majority group in Turkey (i.e., Turks) 17 
in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict context. We investigated how the endorsement of the 18 
independence narrative and terrorism narrative would predict the conflict- and peace-related 19 
outcomes through the pathway of competitive victimhood.  20 
Method 21 
Participants and Procedure 22 
A total of 110 self-identified Turkish participants completed the survey online (see 23 
Table 1 for demographic information). We distributed the link to the survey on a variety of 24 
Facebook groups and blogs. Respondents were informed in the consent form that the goal of 25 
this research was to examine attitudes toward the issue that is variously defined as the 26 
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“Kurdish problem,” “terrorism problem,” “ethnic identity problem,” “Southeastern problem,” 1 
or “independence problem.” We used various labels for the issue to prevent possible 2 
perceptions of research(er) bias (see anonymized for review for a similar approach). Each 3 
survey participant read both narratives. Then, they reported their endorsement of each 4 
narrative, their competitive victimhood, support for non-violent conflict resolution, 5 
forgiveness, and support for aggressive policies and support for stopping violence, as well as 6 
several demographic questions such as gender and level of education.  7 
____________ 8 
Insert Table 1  9 
____________ 10 
Materials  11 
With the exception of the demographic items mentioned above, all items used 7-point 12 
response scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). All means and SDs are reported in 13 
Table 2. 14 
Conflict narratives. We used two conflict narratives identified by previous research 15 
with lay people (anonymized for review): (a) a terrorism narrative and (b) an independence 16 
narrative. Q methodology, a mixed qualitative-quantitative method, was used in that previous 17 
research to identify socially shared perspectives in relation to contentious issues (e.g., Watts 18 
& Stenner, 2012). Based on the findings of the previous research, we created short narratives 19 
that represent the core of these two viewpoints. These narratives have been established and 20 
used by people in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict context (anonymized for review). Participants 21 
were asked to indicate their endorsement of each of the two narratives: 22 
Endorsement of the independence narrative. The following one-item measure 23 
assessed participants’ endorsement of the independence narrative: “In my opinion, the 24 
Kurdish problem is an independence problem for Kurds because the status of Kurds living in 25 
Turkey is like a colony under the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, to solve this problem, an 26 
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independent Kurdistan should be established, and its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, 1 
should be released.” 2 
Endorsement of the terrorism narrative. The following one-item measure assessed 3 
participants’ endorsement of the terrorism narrative: “In my opinion, this problem is a 4 
problem created by the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan). The causes of this problem are 5 
PKK and the instigation of foreign powers. To solve this problem, PKK should give away 6 
their weapons and TSK (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri-Turkish Armed Forces) should fight and end 7 
terror by active counter-terrorism policies. No matter what happens, the unitary state structure 8 
of Turkey should not be changed.” 9 
Competitive victimhood. Competitive victimhood was measured with three items 10 
adapted from Noor et al. (2008): “Throughout the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, Turks suffered 11 
more than Kurds,” “Turkish victims need more protection than Kurdish victims,” and “In 12 
general, the trauma of the events in the 80s and 90s has been more severe for Turks than for 13 
the Kurds.” 14 
Support for non-violent conflict resolution. Two items assessed participants’ 15 
support for non-violent conflict resolution in Turkey (anonymized for review): “In general, I 16 
support the peace process in Turkey” and “The İmralı talks should restart.”  17 
Forgiveness. Four items adapted from Noor et al. (2008) assessed intergroup 18 
forgiveness: “I feel resentment toward Kurdish people for the misdeeds that they committed 19 
in the past” (reverse coded), “I hold ill thoughts about Kurdish people for the misdeeds that 20 
they committed in the past” (reverse coded), “I draw the conclusion that I am prepared to 21 
forgive Kurdish people for the misdeeds that they committed in the past,” and “I am able to 22 
forgive Kurdish people for the misdeeds that they committed in the past.” 23 
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Support for stopping violence. Two items assessed participants’ attitudes toward 1 
TSK’s actions related to stopping violence: “TSK should stop their attacks against PKK 2 
immediately” and “Both PKK and TSK should stop their attacks simultaneously.” 3 
Support for aggressive policies. We developed these three items by taking regional 4 
developments such as the Syrian conflict into account. We also incorporated different parties 5 
of the conflict such as the U.S., YPG and IS into the items we developed. Three items 6 
assessed participants’ attitudes toward supporting aggressive policies: “TSK’s actions against 7 
YPG (e.g., bombing their military bases) in Syria are justifiable”, “The U.S. should support 8 
TSK’s actions (e.g., bombing their military bases) in Syria in their fight against YPG”, and 9 
“The U.S. should support YPG’s actions (e.g., bombing their military bases) in Syria in their 10 
fight against IS” (reverse coded). 11 
Results 12 
Preliminary Analyses 13 
Preliminary analyses examined relations between the variables. Bivariate correlations 14 
indicated that endorsement of the independence narrative correlated negatively with the 15 
endorsement of the terrorism narrative, competitive victimhood, and support for aggressive 16 
policies (see Table 2). At the same time, endorsement of the independence narrative 17 
correlated positively with support for non-violent conflict resolution, forgiveness, and support 18 
for stopping violence. Endorsement of the terrorism narrative also correlated with these other 19 
variables, but in the opposite direction. Competitive victimhood correlated negatively with 20 
support for non-violent conflict resolution, forgiveness, and support for stopping violence, 21 
and positively with support for aggressive policies.  22 
____________ 23 
Insert Table 2  24 
____________ 25 
Analytical Approach 26 
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In testing our core hypotheses through path modeling, we first specified only the 1 
hypothesized paths. To ensure that significant hypothesized relationships remain significant 2 
even when accounting for additional relationships, in a second step we then entered additional 3 
paths and kept them in the model if they were significant. While our resulting models, 4 
therefore, have additional paths, this way they present a more rigorous test of our hypotheses. 5 
Path Analyses 6 
Using the Calis Procedure in SAS 9.4 with maximum likelihood estimation (ML), we 7 
conducted a path analysis to provide one simultaneous test of our hypotheses with respect to 8 
the four outcome variables (support for non-violent conflict resolution, forgiveness, support 9 
for stopping violence, and support for aggressive policies), using 1) endorsement of the 10 
independence and terrorism narrative as exogenous variables, 2) competitive victimhood as 11 
endogenous mediating variable, and 3) support for non-violent conflict resolution, 12 
forgiveness, support for stopping violence, and support for aggressive policies as endogenous 13 
outcome variables. The hypothesized model showed an acceptable fit, χ2(8) = 47.77, p < .001, 14 
SRMR = .10, NFI = .90, CFI = .91, AIC = 87.77. After we added additional paths from 15 
exogenous variables (e.g., endorsement of the terrorism narrative) to endogenous outcome 16 
variables (e.g., support for aggressive policies), the modified model had a better fit, χ2(10) = 17 
25.14, p = .005, SRMR = .06, NFI = .95, CFI = .97, AIC = 63.02 (see Figure 2 for the path 18 
coefficients). A comparison of the hypothesized and modified models by means of chi-square 19 
difference tests showed that the modified model fit the data better than the hypothesized 20 
model, χ2Δ(df = 2) = 22.63, p < .001. 21 
____________ 22 
Insert Figure 2  23 
____________ 24 
In this model, taking into account endorsement of both narratives at the same time, 25 
stronger endorsement of the terrorism narrative predicted more competitive victimhood, 26 
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whereas stronger endorsement of the independence narrative was unrelated to competitive 1 
victimhood and most of the outcome variables (with the exception of support for non-violent 2 
conflict resolution). More competitive victimhood predicted less support for non-violent 3 
conflict resolution, less forgiveness, less support for stopping violence, and more support for 4 
aggressive policies. In addition to this indirect effect of endorsement of the terrorism narrative 5 
on the outcome variables through competitive victimhood (see Table 3 for indirect effects), 6 
endorsement of the terrorism narrative also had an additional positive direct effect on support 7 
for aggressive policies, and an additional negative direct effect on support for stopping 8 
violence. Thus, the effects of endorsement of the terrorism narrative on support for aggressive 9 
policies and support for stopping violence were partially transmitted by competitive 10 
victimhood, whereas the effects of endorsement of terrorism narrative on forgiveness and 11 
support for non-violent conflict resolution were fully transmitted by competitive victimhood. 12 
Importantly, these additional direct effects of the terrorism narrative were in line with our 13 
theoretical expectations regarding the indirect effects of the terrorism narrative.  14 
We also tested an alternative model in which the two narratives mediated the 15 
relationship between competitive victimhood and conflict- and peace-related outcomes (for a 16 
similar strategy, see Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). However, this alternative model was 17 
inferior to our hypothesized model as well as to our modified model (i.e., with additional 18 
paths from exogenous variables to endogenous outcome variables), χ2(5) = 97.60, p < .001, 19 
SRMR = .14, NFI = .80, CFI = .80, AIC = 143.60 (see Supplementary Materials for the 20 
alternative model).  21 
____________ 22 
Insert Table 3  23 
____________ 24 
Discussion 25 
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Study 1 found support for our hypothesis that endorsing the terrorism narrative would 1 
predict more support for aggressive policies, less support for stopping violence, less 2 
forgiveness and less support for non-violent conflict resolution through the pathway of more 3 
competitive victimhood. Study 1 also found support for our hypothesis that endorsing the 4 
independence narrative would predict more support for non-violent conflict resolution; 5 
however, we should also note that Study 1 did not find that the independence narrative 6 
predicted competitive victimhood. While this lack of an indirect pathway through competitive 7 
victimhood did not support our hypothesis, it is also important to note that the direct path 8 
from the independence narrative to support for peace that we found instead did not actively 9 
refute our hypothesis. Only if this path had been negative, would it have actively gone against 10 
our expectations. Instead, this path being positive was generally in line with our theoretical 11 
predictions. 12 
Last, Study 1 found support for our hypothesis that more competitive victimhood 13 
would predict more support for aggressive policies and less support for non-violent conflict 14 
resolution, less support for forgiveness and less support for stopping violence. The results 15 
suggest that endorsement of the rather one-sided terrorism narrative increases competitive 16 
victimhood, and ultimately strengthens support for aggressive policies and weakens support 17 
for forgiveness, stopping violence, and nonviolent conflict resolution. 18 
Study 1 had some limitations though. First, participants were recruited through 19 
snowball sampling on social media sites (e.g., Facebook). Relatedly, participants were mostly 20 
left on the political spectrum and not very religious. We addressed this issue in Study 2 by 21 
making a more concerted effort to get a more heterogeneous sample regarding these 22 
demographics. Second, we situated Study 2 in a different conflict context than Study 1 (the 23 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict), and consequently also targeted a different group for our sample 24 
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(Jewish Israelis) to address the average level of competitive victimhood in Study 1 (M = 1 
2.71).  2 
Study 1 made use of conflict narratives that were identified in previous research in the 3 
Turkish-Kurdish conflict context (anonymized for review). However, it is unclear to what 4 
extent these narratives are applicable in other conflict contexts. Therefore, Study 2 tested the 5 
applicability and generalizability of these narratives in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 6 
conflict. The aim here was to show that the processes found in Study 1 are not unique to a 7 
specific conflict but replicate in other contexts that differ in many respects such as history, 8 
language, religion, and levels of violence. 9 
Study 2 10 
Study 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 in the context of the Israeli-11 
Palestinian conflict. Specifically, Study 2 examined whether endorsing a particular conflict 12 
narrative predicts conflict- and peace-related outcomes and whether the terrorism and 13 
independence narratives generalize to contexts other than the Turkish-Kurdish one. While 14 
doing so, Study 2 also improved on the recruitment strategy and sampling issues of Study 1, 15 
as well as on the average level of competitive victimhood in Study 1. As we aimed to get a 16 
representative sample in Israel, we also aimed to have more variance on the variables of 17 
interest that we did not have in the more left-leaning sample of Study 1. 18 
Method 19 
Participants 20 
A total of 199 Jewish Israeli participants participated in our study (see Table 4 for 21 
demographic information). To obtain a more heterogeneous sample with respect to political 22 
orientation, we used a research company to recruit a representative sample (matched on 2015 23 
voting patterns) of self-identified Jewish-Israeli participants (The Midgam Project Web Panel: 24 
www.midgam.com). Midgam is a company that specializes in providing infrastructure 25 
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services for internet research and allows for surveying samples representative of the Israeli 1 
population. 2 
____________ 3 
Insert Table 4  4 
____________ 5 
Materials  6 
Participants completed a similar set of measures as in Study 1 (see Table 3 and 7 
Appendix; see Supplementary Materials for all the measures), most of them having a similar 8 
wording and content; only for the measures of support for nonviolent conflict resolution and 9 
support for aggressive policies, we adapted the items to fit the context of the Israeli-10 
Palestinian conflict. We also dropped the measure of support for stopping violence in Study 2, 11 
to keep the model simple.2 All items used 7-point response scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 12 
strongly agree).  13 
Support for non-violent conflict resolution. Two items assessed participants’ 14 
support for non-violent conflict resolution in Israel: “I support a peace agreement with the 15 
Palestinians on the basis of two states for two people” and “I support a unilateral Israeli 16 
withdrawal from territories in Judea and Samaria.”  17 
Support for aggressive policies. Four items assessed participants’ support for 18 
aggressive policies: “I support expelling Palestinians from the land of Israel,” “I support the 19 
continuation of the current situation,” “I support annexing some of the territories to Israel 20 
(such as Area C and Maale Adumim), and continued Israeli control of the rest of the 21 
territories” and “I support annexing the entire West Bank and instating Israeli Jurisdiction 22 
over the territories.”  23 
Results 24 
Preliminary Analyses 25 
 
2 We dropped this measure as we have already had a similar outcome measure (i.e., support for non-violent 
conflict resolution) and therefore to keep the model simple, we decided to drop it. 
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As in Study 1, bivariate correlations indicated that endorsement of the independence 1 
narrative correlated negatively with the endorsement of the terrorism narrative, competitive 2 
victimhood, and support for aggressive policies, and positively with forgiveness and support 3 
for nonviolent conflict resolution (see Table 5). Endorsement of the terrorism narrative also 4 
correlated with these variables, but in the opposite direction. Competitive victimhood 5 
correlated negatively with forgiveness and support for non-violent conflict resolution, and 6 
positively with support for aggressive policies. 7 
____________ 8 
Insert Table 5  9 
____________ 10 
Path Analyses 11 
A path analysis provided one simultaneous test of our hypothesis regarding the three 12 
outcome variables (support for non-violent conflict resolution, forgiveness, and support for 13 
aggressive policies), using 1) endorsement of the independence and terrorism narrative as 14 
exogenous variables, 2) competitive victimhood as endogenous mediating variable, and 3) 15 
support for non-violent conflict resolution, forgiveness, and support for aggressive policies as 16 
endogenous outcome variables. The hypothesized model did not show a good fit, χ2(6) = 17 
134.08, p < .001, SRMR = .16, NFI = .74, CFI = .75, AIC = 164.08. After we added additional 18 
paths from exogenous variables (e.g., endorsement of the terrorism narrative) to endogenous 19 
outcome variables (e.g., support for aggressive policies) as in Study 1, the model fit the data 20 
well, χ2(4) = 7.20, p = .126, SRMR = .03, NFI = .99, CFI = .99, AIC = 41.19 (see Figure 3 for 21 
the path coefficients). A comparison of the hypothesized and modified models by means of 22 
chi-square difference tests showed that the modified model fit the data better than the 23 
hypothesized model, χ2Δ(df = 2) = 126.88, p < .001. 24 
____________ 25 
Insert Figure 3   26 
____________ 27 
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Stronger endorsement of the terrorism narrative predicted more competitive 1 
victimhood, whereas stronger endorsement of the independence narrative predicted less 2 
competitive victimhood. More competitive victimhood predicted less support for non-violent 3 
conflict resolution and less forgiveness, and more support for aggressive policies. Lastly, 4 
endorsement of the independence narrative predicted more support for non-violent conflict 5 
resolution and less support for aggressive policies. Besides the predicted indirect effects of the 6 
narratives on the outcome variables through competitive victimhood (see Table 6 for indirect 7 
effects), again, as in Study 1, there were also additional direct effects.  8 
As in Study 1, we also tested the alternative model: The two narratives mediated the 9 
relationship between competitive victimhood and conflict- and peace-related outcomes (for a 10 
similar strategy see Noor et al., 2008). This alternative model, χ2(4) = 87.70, p < .001, SRMR 11 
= .12, NFI = .83, CFI = .84, AIC = 121.70, was empirically superior to our hypothesized 12 
model but not empirically superior to our modified model. Yet, given that the purpose of 13 
Study 2 was to replicate and confirm the model of Study 1, we consider our modified model 14 
(i.e., with additional paths from exogenous variables to endogenous outcome variables) to be 15 
superior from a theoretical and confirmatory hypothesis testing perspective. 16 
____________ 17 
Insert Table 6  18 
____________ 19 
Discussion 20 
Study 2 provided support for our hypothesis that endorsement of the terrorism 21 
narrative predicts more support for aggressive policies and less support for non-violent 22 
conflict resolution and forgiveness through the pathway of more competitive victimhood. 23 
Study 2 also found support for our hypothesis that endorsement of the independence narrative 24 
predicts more support for non-violent conflict resolution and less support for aggressive 25 
policies, but it did not predict more support for forgiveness. Finally, the results of Study 2 26 
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provided evidence for our hypothesis that more competitive victimhood predicts more support 1 
for aggressive policies and less support for non-violent conflict resolution and forgiveness. 2 
Importantly, whereas Study 1 found no evidence for a significant relationship of the 3 
independence narrative with less competitive victimhood, Study 2 found this relationship to 4 
be significant in the expected direction. This finding is particularly noteworthy given that the 5 
Jewish Israeli sample in Study 2 was overall more right-wing than the Turkish sample in 6 
Study 1.  7 
General discussion 8 
Our results highlighted the relationship between endorsing conflict narratives and 9 
conflict- and peace-related outcomes such as forgiveness, support for non-violent conflict 10 
resolution and support for aggressive policies. In addition, competitive victimhood was shown 11 
to be an important mediator of the relationship between conflict narratives and these conflict- 12 
and peace-related outcomes. The results of Study 1 indicated that endorsing the terrorism 13 
narrative predicts more support for aggressive policies, less support for stopping violence, less 14 
forgiveness and less support for non-violent conflict resolution through the pathway of more 15 
competitive victimhood. Study 1 also found support for our hypothesis that more competitive 16 
victimhood predicts more support for aggressive policies and less support for non-violent 17 
conflict resolution, less support for forgiveness and less support for stopping violence. Study 18 
2 conceptually replicated the results of Study 1 with respect to the effects of the terrorism 19 
narrative. Further, Study 2 also found effects of the independence narrative on predicting 20 
competitive victimhood and support for aggressive policies negatively and support for non-21 
violent conflict resolution positively, as expected in the opposite direction of the terrorism 22 
narrative. Finally, it is noteworthy we found these findings not only among our left-leaning 23 
sample in Turkey but also among our representative sample in Israel.  24 
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Our findings further our understanding of how a culturally dominant conflict narrative 1 
increases competitive victimhood. Perceiving one’s group to be a victim may lead to the 2 
perception that such aggressive steps are necessary for the group’s security in spite of the fact 3 
that the in-group is more powerful, to begin with. In this way, the research presented here 4 
helps to understand the actions of groups in intractable conflicts, and why these actions (e.g., 5 
aggression or coercion) seem rational to those groups, while other groups (e.g., third parties or 6 
allies of the other side in the conflict), especially from an outside perspective, view these 7 
actions as irrational. However, this research also suggests that there is diversity in the conflict 8 
narratives at play in conflicts, and these alternative conflict narratives (e.g., independence 9 
narrative) that are usually embraced by the minority or low-power group in a conflict can also 10 
play an important role in the majority or high-power group embracing more constructive 11 
orientations to the conflict and its resolution. The results show that if majority group members 12 
think violence is the result of frustrated national aspirations, they may try to find a way to 13 
satisfy these aspirations. If they think violence is characteristic of the out-group, they may 14 
want to fight back and eliminate the threat. In a similar vein, our results indicate that the 15 
independence narrative can have positive outcomes even for majority groups, among which 16 
this narrative is not the dominant narrative. 17 
The finding that the effects of conflict narratives (especially the terrorism narrative) 18 
largely replicated in two different conflicts with different groups and histories also supports 19 
the notion that although every conflict has unique characteristics (Yıldız, 2014), there are also 20 
important commonalities that different conflicts share (see also Aktaş, 2014). Specifically, our 21 
results indicate that the terrorism and the independence narrative, which were originally 22 
derived from the context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict (anonymized for review), also play 23 
important roles in other conflicts characterized by a struggle between asymmetrical powers 24 
that can either be seen as a struggle for independence or as terrorism. Thus, the independence 25 
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narrative and its peace-related outcomes can have important implications for conflict 1 
resolution and intervention more generally (rather than only in one specific conflict). 2 
Overall, our results contribute to the works of literature on conflict narratives and 3 
competitive victimhood in particular and on peace and conflict in general by highlighting the 4 
crucial link between endorsement of conflict narratives, competitive victimhood, and conflict- 5 
and peace-related outcomes such as forgiveness, support for non-violent conflict resolution 6 
and support for aggressive policies. In addition, the results highlight the importance of 7 
acknowledging the diversity of conflict narratives in a society, including narratives that are 8 
less visible than the dominant narrative born out of the ethos of conflict. As dominant 9 
narratives present the conflict in black and white terms and produce mistrust, hostility, a sense 10 
of threat between the conflict parties, reduce support for compromise, and influence 11 
individuals to interpret situations in ways that contribute to the perpetuation or even escalation 12 
of the conflict (Cohrs et al., 2015), alternative narratives may help majority group members 13 
see the conflict in a new light. The identification of such alternative voices may contribute to 14 
a more differentiated conflict analysis and in turn more effective approaches to conflict 15 
resolution and reconciliation (Coleman, 2003; Shmueli, 2003). This argument is connected to 16 
the concept of “counter-narratives” (Bamberg & Andrews, 2004) and the notion that 17 
identifying counter-narratives can help to diversify the social realities that circulate and are 18 
considered in society, which in turn may help develop strategies of change (Grabe & Dutt, 19 
2015). As minority views sometimes have greater potential for social change (Elcheroth et al., 20 
2011; see also Subašić et al., 2008), we argue that incorporating the majority/dominant 21 
narrative of the adversary group (e.g., independence narrative) into the perspective of one’s 22 
own group may thus open up some new opportunities for conflict resolution and 23 
peacebuilding.  24 
Limitations and Future Directions 25 
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Our research has a few specific limitations. First, even though our results show that 1 
the conflict narratives and their outcomes generalize to different conflict contexts, we should 2 
highlight that there are some differences between the two studies. For example, the correlation 3 
between the two narratives is considerably higher in Study 1 than in Study 2; the competitive 4 
victimhood mean is considerably higher in Study 2 than in Study 1; and the terrorism 5 
narrative mean is higher in Study 2 than in Study 1. We wonder to what extent these 6 
differences may be related to the left- vs. right-leaning tendencies of the samples in both 7 
studies, but not to the nature of the conflict. Even though there are some differences between 8 
the two studies, we should highlight again that we found the findings among our left-leaning 9 
sample in Turkey are generalizable to our more right-leaning sample in Israel and some 10 
fundamental processes are highly similar. 11 
Second, we conducted these studies in different phases of the respective conflicts. 12 
Turkish data collection occurred during the escalation of the conflict after the breakdown of 13 
the Turkish-Kurdish peace process, whereas Israeli data collection occurred during a 14 
relatively calmer period of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Previous research has indicated that 15 
people’s understanding of conflict can shift during periods of conflict escalation (Bilali, Çelik, 16 
& Ok, 2014; Uluğ, Odağ, Cohrs, & Holtz, 2017). This difference might explain why we were 17 
not able to detect the differential effects of the two narratives as easily in the Turkish study as 18 
in the Israeli study. Second, we focused on competitive victimhood rather than distinguishing 19 
between inclusive (i.e., perceiving other groups’ suffering as similar to one’s own group) and 20 
exclusive victim beliefs (i.e., the perceived distinctiveness of ingroup victimization; see 21 
Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015). Previous research suggests that victim beliefs do not always lead to 22 
violence (Vollhardt, 2009). If people endorse victim beliefs that recognize similarities of 23 
experiences between the conflict parties, this may help them empathize with the other side of 24 
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the conflict (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). Future studies should, therefore, examine whether 1 
different conflict narratives may lead people to engage in inclusive vs. exclusive victimhood.  2 
Third, one may question why the endorsement of narratives is assessed with a single 3 
item and argue that these items may have the potential to be multi-barreled and therefore 4 
multi-dimensional. However, we chose this approach because these narratives have been 5 
developed based on empirical studies (anonymized for review), used in previous research and 6 
it was well established that these narratives may predict peace-related attitudes such as 7 
reconciliation (anonymized for review). Future studies may consider using shorter narratives 8 
to avoid multi-dimensionality. In addition to the specific alternative narratives we have used 9 
(i.e., independence narrative) in this research, future research may also look at yet other 10 
alternative narratives, for instance, the ones found in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict: a) 11 
economic narrative, b) democracy and Islam narrative, and c) democracy and rights narrative 12 
(anonymized for review). Many people may also endorse different narratives to some extent. 13 
This ambivalence may have an epistemic basis (trying to understand why violence happens) 14 
and/or a motivational basis (each narrative has both costs and benefits for the in-group). 15 
Therefore, future studies may also look to what extent people endorse more than one narrative 16 
at the same time and how the endorsement of both different narratives may help to find 17 
common grounds across these narratives.  18 
Fourth, in both studies, we tested an alternative model in which the two narratives 19 
mediated the relationship between competitive victimhood and conflict- and peace-related 20 
outcomes (see, e.g., Noor et al., 2008). In Study 1, this alternative model was inferior to our 21 
hypothesized model as well as to our modified model. In Study 2, even though this alternative 22 
model was empirically superior to our hypothesized model it was not empirically superior to 23 
our modified model. As the purpose of Study 2 was to replicate and confirm the model of 24 
Study 1, we consider our modified model to be superior from a theoretical and confirmatory 25 
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hypothesis testing perspective. One can argue that it may be equally plausible for competitive 1 
victimhood to motivate particular narratives and both models are equally likely. Adelman et 2 
al. (2016) showed how different conflict narratives (inclusive vs. exclusive) may affect 3 
competitive victimhood in experimental studies. Therefore, we believe that it is conflict 4 
narratives that may motivate people to engage in competitive victimhood. However, future 5 
studies should also test the sequence of these processes with larger samples and experimental 6 
studies. 7 
Given that the two conflicts we focused on are asymmetrical and protracted conflicts, 8 
our data cannot speak to whether our findings are generalizable to 1) symmetrical and/or non-9 
protracted conflicts and 2) the minority or the less powerful party in the conflict. While our 10 
focus on one particular (and particularly important) type of conflict had the advantage of 11 
examining the extent to which our findings were reproducible across different countries, 12 
future studies may also examine the extent to which these results can be reproduced in other 13 
types of conflicts (e.g., the relatively more symmetrical conflict in Northern Ireland). In this 14 
sense, our results speak to the generalizability across countries but stay silent on 15 
generalizability across types of conflicts. Also, in each conflict setting, due to the 16 
asymmetrical nature of the conflict (see Elcheroth & Spini, 2015), these parties are the 17 
stronger parties compared to their opponents. However, we do not know what happens if the 18 
minority or the less powerful party in the conflict endorses the narrative held by the majority 19 
of the other, stronger party. Previous research indicated that when Palestinians show empathy 20 
for the Holocaust, it leads to reciprocal empathy between Palestinians and Israelis (Gubler, 21 
Halperin, & Hirschberger, 2015). Future research should also focus on whether endorsement 22 
of the more powerful group’s narrative in an ongoing conflict increases competitive 23 
victimhood among the less powerful group, or not. To more fully understand the link between 24 
conflict narratives, competitive victimhood, and conflict- and peace-related outcomes, the 25 
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phenomena and processes we have shown here should also be investigated from the 1 
perspective of the less powerful party to the conflict. 2 
Finally, future studies may focus on intervention strategies to change competitive 3 
victimhood via conflict narratives. Vollhardt and Bilali (2015) argue that hearing stories about 4 
others’ suffering, which are similar to one’s ingroup experiences, through intergroup contact 5 
may increase inclusive victimhood. We argue that even hearing the way in which the other 6 
side understands the conflict as well as the reasons for the other side’s actions through 7 
intergroup contact may be helpful to lower competitive victimhood (see also Bruneau & Saxe, 8 
2012). Future studies may also look for intervention strategies on how to change competitive 9 
victimhood by exposing people to others’ conflict narratives, which may pave the way for 10 
conflict resolution (see also Adelman et al., 2016). For example, interventions should focus on 11 
how to increase perspective-taking or empathy since both studies indicate that the problem is 12 
a one-sided view of the conflict that does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the other. The 13 
paradox is that the one-sided view is psychologically more satisfying (e.g., we are good, they 14 
are evil) but leaves less hope for improvement (e.g., if they are evil in essence, there is little to 15 
do but fight them). The independence narrative may be seen as undermining the group and 16 
even treacherous, but it offers hope for change by indicating if we address the grievances, 17 
hostilities between groups may decrease.  18 
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 Table 1 
Demographic information for Study 1. 
 Frequency/Mean/SD 





PhD  19 
Master’s degree 27 
Bachelor’s degree 46 
High-school degree 17 
Secondary-school degree 1 
Political orientation M = 3.10 
SD = 1.93 
Range = 1 (left) – 9 (right) 
Religiosity M = 2.56 
SD = 2.24 
Range = 1 (not religious at all) –  
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Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01  1 
  2 
Table 2 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Independence narrative - 
2.79 
(1.94) 
-       
2. Terrorism narrative - 
3.87 
(2.37) 
-.73*** -      
3. Competitive victimhood .83 
2.71 
(1.48) 
-.53*** .69*** -     





.57*** -.62*** -.60*** -    
5. Forgiveness .75 
5.53 
(1.25) 
.30** -.31** -.48*** .45*** -   





.55*** -.68*** -.78*** .68*** .51*** -  





-.63*** .73*** .71*** -.58*** -.49*** -.74*** - 
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Table 3 1 
 2 
Standardized indirect effects (Study 1). 3 
Note. Although endorsement of the independence narrative was not a significant predictor of 4 
competitive victimhood in the model (see Figure 2), to be consistent across the two 5 
independent variables, we tested (and showed) non-significant indirect effects of endorsement 6 
of the independence narrative on the dependent variables. 7 
 8 
 9 
  10 
 Indirect 
effect 










.016 .064 .254 .799 -.11 .14 
Forgiveness .013 .052 .254 .799 -.08 .11 
Support for 
stopping violence 
.020 .082 .254 .799 -.14 .36 
Support for 
aggressive policies 
-.019 .074 -.254 .799 -.16 .13 




-.405 .074 -5.434 < .001 -.55 -.26 
Forgiveness -.323 .071 -4.549 < .001 -.46 -.18 
Support for 
stopping violence 
-.513 .081 -6.313 < .001 -.67 -.36 
Support for 
aggressive policies 
.467 .078 5.977 < .001 .32 .62 
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Table 4 1 
Demographic information for Study 2. 2 
 Frequency/Mean/SD 





PhD  1 
Master’s degree 23 
Bachelor’s degree 49 
Non-academic professional training 41 
Passed a Full Baccalaureate exam 54 
High-school degree 22 
Elementary-school degree 3 
Other 6 
Political orientation M = 6.01 
SD = 2.15 
Range = 1 (left) – 9 (right) 
Religiosity M = 3.81 
SD = 2.74 
Range = 1 (not religious at all) –  
9 (very religious 
 3 
  4 
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Table 5 1 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables in Study 2. 2 
 3 
Note. ***p < .001  4 




1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Independence narrative - 
2.79 
(1.99) 
-      
2. Terrorism narrative - 
4.48 
(2.09) 
-.46*** -     
3. Competitive victimhood     .81 
4.58 
(1.73) 
-.39*** .53*** -    





.66*** -.53*** -.48*** -   
5. Forgiveness .83 
3.23 
(1.61) 
.37*** -.49*** -.60*** .44*** -  





-.50*** .63*** .60*** -.53*** -.50*** - 
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Table 6 1 
 2 






























.088 .033 2.637 .008 .02 .15 
Forgiveness .110 .040 2.708 .006 .03 .19 
Support for 
aggressive policies 
-.111 .041 -2.711 .006 -.19 -.03 




-.214 .039 -5.383 < .001 -.29 -.17 
Forgiveness -.267 .043 -6.094 < .001 -.35 -.18 
Support for 
aggressive policies 
.269 .044 6.122 < .001 .18 .36 




















































Figure 2. Path model for Study 1 14 
Note. Dashed lines indicate non-significant paths; ***p < .001, **p < .01. 15 
 16 















































Figure 3. Path model for Study 2  14 


















.45*** -.24*** .34*** 
.35*** 
-.46*** -.47*** 




Conflict narratives in Israel 2 
Independence narrative. In my opinion, the Palestinian problem is an independence problem 3 
for Palestinians and that once Palestinians gain independence, they will no longer be 4 
motivated to continue the conflict. Therefore, an independent Palestine should be established 5 
alongside Israel if we want to resolve this problem. 6 
Terrorism narrative. In my opinion, the Palestinian problem is a problem created by 7 
Palestinian terrorism. If we want to solve this problem, Israel needs to deal with terrorism, 8 
and the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) should put an end to terror by active counter-terrorism 9 
operations. Such a solution to the Palestinian problem would also make it unnecessary to 10 
divide the Land of Israel and create a Palestinian state on this land. 11 
